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NEW PARADIGMS AND RECURRING PARADOXES IN EDUCATION FOR CITIZENSHIP: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON

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FOREWORD

This volume begins a series featuring examples of the best scholarship in comparative and international education. The series, *International Perspectives on Education and Society*, developed and published by Elsevier Science Ltd., is a revival of an annual review of scholarship in this field. We are pleased to have this collection of scholarship on comparative analysis of civic education as the new series' inaugural edition.

The volume was undergoing final copy-editing as the world watched in horror the emergence of mass lethal political terrorism perpetrated in the attacks on New York City and Washington D.C. on 11 September 2001. Perhaps no aspect of education relates as directly to the passions and discussions raised in the aftermath of these attacks as the role of formal schooling in the education of a modern citizenry throughout the world. Widespread mass education is a major vehicle for political socialization within a complex global world. Understanding if, and how, schools across nations prepare adolescents to undertake the role of citizen is the dramatic, timely topic of this collection of studies.

The studies here also represent an exciting innovation in large-scale comparative studies of schooling outcomes and instructional processes. Following the recent trend toward blending both qualitative and quantitative data collections in multi-national studies, the IEA Civic Education Study incorporated 24 national case studies and published preliminary results from them. Illustrating the full utility of comparative case studies, this volume's seven empirical chapters (2 to 8) present in-depth comparative analyses of these data. In providing this substantive service to the comparative field, these chapters are a rich example of comparative approaches to complex qualitative data for both theoretical knowledge and education policy analysis. Furthermore, the lead chapter by the editors is a tour de force review of methodological issues in comparative qualitative analysis. And the final chapter puts the broader trend of cross-national collection and analysis of qualitative data into an informative context both substantively and methodologically.

I want to thank the guest editors of this volume, as well as the IEA, for their efforts in providing comparative and international scholars with this groundbreaking collection of qualitative studies in civic education. As we have
7. SPHERES OF CITIZENSHIP

Gita Steiner-Khamsi

COMING TO GRIPS WITH DECONTEXTUALIZATION

The study of citizenship traditionally has attracted a wide range of scholars from different social science disciplines. Curiously, the particular focus on education for citizenship has not narrowed the disciplinary base but rather extended the range of academic fields dealing with this topic. With educational researchers joining the ranks of scholars in political science, sociology, psychology and philosophy, it becomes legitimate to ask, what, exactly, differentiates these different research paradigms and methods of inquiry? Comparative education research, in particular, reveals a host of different research avenues for approaching the study of citizenship education.

Noah (1985, p. 869) succinctly summarizes the four major uses of comparative education research as follows:

Comparative education uses data from one or more countries or regions: (a) to describe educational systems, processes, or outcomes; (b) to assist in the development of educational institutions and practices; (c) to throw light on the relationship between education and society; and (d) to establish generalized statements about education that are valid for more than one country.

Studies by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) typically are regarded as studies that operate within the first application of comparative education research, for they document, describe and analyze, in one way or another, processes or outcomes of educational systems.
Scholars in comparative education research have challenged this earlier focus on national educational systems, demanding that more attention be paid to social groups within a system (Altbach, 1991) and within smaller institutional units of analysis (Bray & Thomas, 1995).

By far the greatest challenge has been to deal with critics of cross-national analyses who contend that comparative studies are, of necessity, bare of context. According to these critics, the very act of comparison across cultural boundaries implies a level of abstraction that might, at first sight, yield interesting findings with regard to similarities and differences between various contexts. Upon closer examination, however, this kind of contrastive analysis is devoid of any explanatory power for understanding those very similarities and differences. Moreover, many similarities and differences between countries are artificially constructed and are artifacts of a method—the contrastive method—that neglects cultural nuances and local interpretations. For example, the differences in terminology that are manifest in the participating countries of the Civic Education Study, such as “citizenship education,” “civic education,” “education for democracy,” “civics,” “political education” or “government studies,” might suggest that we are dealing here with different conceptions and contents of civic education. We might find, however, that reviewed from a contextual perspective, these differences in terminology do not correspond to semantic differences. It is conceivable that, for a variety of historical and political reasons, which can only be explored contextually, the civics-related subject matter is merely labeled differently from country to country despite the content of the subject matter being similar. However, the contrary could also apply. Similarities should not be taken at face value, either, given that several of the civic education case studies refer, for example, to the civics-related subject matter as “citizenship education” but mean something entirely different when analyzed in the context of each individual case study.

In response to criticisms of large-scale comparative studies, however, the study presented in this chapter attempts to illustrate the claim that cross-national analyses do not necessarily need to be de-contextualized, and that comparative studies do not have to maneuver themselves into a de-contextualized vacuum from which they observe transnational similarities or differences. In fact, comparative education as an academic field has, since its early days, emphasized the need to consider context. Nevertheless, Sadler’s early reminder “that things outside the schools matter even more than the things inside the schools, and govern and interpret the things inside the schools” has haunted cross-national and cross-cultural analyses for the last 100 years (Sadler, 1900, cited in Bereday, 1964, p. 310).

Despite criticism of large-scale studies that rank the performance of student populations across countries, often tempting policy-makers either to applaud or condemn ongoing school improvement efforts in their own system according to their own particular educational reform agendas, these studies can provide useful insights. For example, the first volume of the IEA Civic Education Study (Torney-Purta et al., 1999), comprising summaries of country case studies that were developed by educational researchers in 24 countries and were based on comparable research questions, contains information that is of interest not only to policy-makers, but also to policy analysts and educational researchers. A very simple question, such as “What official curriculum goals exist?” or the even simpler, “What is the national terminology for civics-related subjects?” yields interesting findings when approached from a comparative perspective. The 24 country case studies support earlier findings that most countries integrate civic education in the subject matters of social studies, history, geography and literature, and that it is offered as a separate core subject only in upper secondary schools or high schools. More importantly, how these civics core subjects at the high school level are conceptualized tells us something about different emphases with regard to citizenship education. For example, in Australia the civics-related subjects include “studies of society and environment” and “human society and its environment” (Print et al., 1999), whereas in Portugal the subject that is most closely related to civic education in the lower grades is labeled “personal and social education” and is offered as an alternative to moral and religious education (Menezes et al., 1999). Hence, describing educational reforms from a comparative perspective enables us to highlight country-specific characteristics of civic education.

Nevertheless, the methodological challenges of comparing educational systems in a manner that is contextually and culturally sensitive are many. In this study, I would like to address a key challenge that we encounter when we engage in comparative studies: how to analyze a specific construct— in this study, “civic education”—that has a different meaning in different contexts. More quantitatively oriented researchers identify this challenge typically as one of multi-dimensionality of data while qualitatively oriented researchers point out that different conceptions of “citizenship” will be embedded in the various case studies.

The IEA Civic Education Study is based on self-reported educational policies and practices. Most IEA civic education case studies are based on a combination of interviews, surveys and document analysis; a few also include observations in classrooms. It is, thus, not the method of inquiry that these different studies share, but the interpretive framework. This particular analysis of the IEA Civic Education Study operates within Noah’s (Noah, 1985) third interpretive
framework and examines whether there exist different cultural dimensions or spheres of citizenship that account for different models of civic education. That said, I shall assume different models of civic education do, indeed, exist, because different political cultures exist within each national or regional context.

SETTING THE STAGE

The 24 case studies of the IEA Civic Education Study were developed by research teams in the respective countries. These teams gathered together quantitative and qualitative data on civic education that relate to specific policy aspects (for example, textbooks, curricular frameworks, teacher education) and address four different content areas (democracy, national identity, disenfranchised groups, and free choice). In addition to using the same research questions to collect data, the research teams developed a comprehensive review of literature covering previous civic education studies, and wrote a short case study report that was published by Torney-Purta et al. (1999). It is important to point out that these different sets of questions were previously determined in international meetings of the participating research teams. Thus, the research teams examined the same civic-related issues in their respective countries according to this prior “social agreement.” Given the political sensitivity of the topic and in order to prevent biases toward specific models of democracy, it was crucial to reach agreement on what to examine in each case study. As a result of this consensus-driven research design, the data collection criteria and the research topics were clearly defined so as to provide comparable sets of data. The amount of information that was gathered in each case study is overwhelming. In my analysis in this chapter, I refer to all the available material for each of the selected case studies. This means the analysis is based on the data collected for the policy-related issues and the four content areas, as well as on the country-specific reviews of literature and the country case study reports.

Determined not to codify or quantify the rich qualitative data, nor to use the case studies merely as anecdotal evidence to make a case, I opted for a hypothesis-driven design that would allow me to narrow my thematic focus and to select only a few cases for further analysis. Interested in understanding the impact of political culture on civic education models, I first formulated hypotheses with regard to cultural spheres or dimensions of citizenship derived from a review of research literature, especially in political science, sociology and political philosophy. From this literature review, I formulated four different spheres of citizenship: constitutional, economic, civic, and moral. My next step was to select case studies that appeared to be prototypical for each of these spheres. I chose to focus on the case studies from Hong Kong, Germany, Romania and the United States, mainly because I expected them to be prototypical cases for each of the postulated spheres of citizenship, and partly because of my familiarity with two of the political systems, Germany and the United States. Finally, I examined whether these four hypothetical spheres of citizenship corresponded with the empirical data provided by the IEA case studies.

SPHERES OF CITIZENSHIP:
A HYPOTHETICAL MODEL

The idea of examining notions of citizenship in the context of societal spheres was first developed by philosopher Hannah Arendt. In The Human Condition (1958), Arendt presents a historical perspective of how these different spheres of society have developed. She contends that in modern societies citizens simultaneously inhabit three realms or spheres of citizenship: the public-political sphere, the social sphere, and the private sphere. There is variation not only in terms of social role (for example, the roles of “wife” in the private sphere, “worker” in the social sphere and “voter” in the political sphere) but also in terms of the means by which each sphere is socially regulated.

According to Arendt, each of the three spheres is governed by a different principle that acts as a cohesive force within the sphere. In the public-political sphere, the principle of equality is prevalent in securing equal rights for citizens while simultaneously taking account of their individual backgrounds with regard to gender, class, race and ethnicity. In fact, Arendt asserts that the political sphere – the sphere of law and constitutional rights – is the only sphere “in which we are all treated as equals” (Arendt, 1986, p. 106; see also the 1957 edition of her text). In contrast to the first sphere, which is governed by the general principle of equality, universality and social inclusion, the second sphere – the social sphere – is based on social distinctions and role differentiation. In this sphere, individuals form civic associations and collectives based on similar social status, roles, backgrounds and interests. Moreover, within this sphere, it is socially acceptable for individuals to “discriminate” or differentiate between their own group(s) and other groups. Professional associations are examples of organized groups that restrict their membership to individuals with specific qualifications. Similarly, this sphere hosts political interest groups and new social movements (for example, feminist, peace, gay and lesbian, ecology) that defend the particular interests of their groups vis-à-vis the interests and privileges of other groups. Lastly, the private sphere is characterized by the
principle of social exclusion. Individuals choose to bond with certain individuals (partners and friends) and, as a result, exclude others from their private spheres. Arendt depicts the gradual expansion of the social sphere from a historical perspective, detailing the means by which formerly political or private functions have been absorbed as elements of the social sphere. Civic associations located in the social sphere, such as the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, for example, have succeeded in influencing the legal system, which is part of the first (political) sphere. We could interpret the resurgence of "civil society" debates that acknowledge the great impact of the non-governmental sector (civic associations, businesses, social movements) on public policy issues as a direct manifestation of the growing significance of the social sphere (Alexander, 1998; Gellner, 1995; Putnam, 1995). However, feminist scholars Seyla Benhabib (1991, 1993), Nancy Fraser (1994, 1997) and Iris Marion Young (1993) find Arendt's insistence on the strict boundaries between these three spheres misleading and suggest that the civic sphere should be regarded as part of the public-political sphere. The New Feminist Movement is a living example of how concerns that are considered to be private (reproduction rights, physical abuse, sexuality) have been carried into the public-political sphere and, ultimately, the legal system. In addition, in particular for minorities, the struggle for social redistribution of economic resources has always been accompanied by political struggles of another kind - cultural recognition of different lifestyles, languages and cultures. Nancy Fraser's book Justice Interruptus (1997) poignantly illustrates these two kinds of political struggle that exist side by side: the political struggle for social redistribution and the struggle for cultural recognition. Insisting on a strict separation of the three spheres and confining the political struggles for cultural recognition to the private and social spheres, as Arendt's spherical model would prompt us to do, would negate the political agenda of these cultural struggles.

Other scholars in philosophy and political science have also found Arendt's emphasis on constitutional aspects of public-political life too narrow. What regulates the public-political sphere, that is, what is left once life between our four walls (private sphere) and life with persons with whom we interact, bond or identify (social sphere) are excluded, is much more than the constitution. Benhabib (1991), for example, points out that Arendt's narrow focus on constitutional matters of politics is not surprising given her high regard for the Greek polis as the singular model of democracy in which citizens continuously engage in a dialogue in order to determine the individual rights of citizens. Over 40 years after Arendt's pioneering conception of the public-political sphere, it seems necessary to review the scope of this sphere in the light of more recent developments that include, for example, the spread of anti-statism, the global diffusion of free-market orientations, the rise of the multinational economy, and the advance of global technology. In addition, the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the rise of the New World Order, advocated under the Reagan and Thatcher administrations, forged a new, inextricable bond between the political and economic spheres, reducing politicians, more often than not, to negotiators for international free trade. At stake here is not only the changing meaning of government but also the changing meaning of nation-state: the transnational flow of capital, people, ideas, and communications has visibly blurred the boundaries of nation-states.

If we were merely to embrace a traditional notion of civic education that deals in one way or the other with democracy, politics, geography or history, there would be good reasons for concern. From the early 1990s on, several scholars of diverse political orientation questioned whether these four pillars of civic life would endure into the new century. In succession, at least four scholars have predicted the doom of history (Fukuyama, 1992; see also Fukuyama, 1996), geography (O'Brien, 1992), democracy (Guéhenno, 1993) and politics (Schedler, 1997). Fukuyama, in The End of History? (1996), and Schedler, in The End of Politics? (1997), ask whether this demise has already taken place, while O'Brien (1992) and Guéhenno (1993) explicitly contend (respectively in the End of Geography and la fin de la démocratie) that democracy, politics, geography and history have, in fact, met their end. These four authors, certainly not the only prophets of doom in the social sciences, focus on different aspects of the downfall. Fukuyama (1993) focuses on the end of the ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States, and reflects on the consequences of having only one global dominant ideology, that which is based on American neo-liberalism. O'Brien (1992) and Guéhenno (1994) express concern regarding global economic forces that are increasingly shaping the political decision-making process. Specifically, O'Brien (1992) reflects on the new geo-political reconfiguration of the global world economy, which transcends national boundaries. Guéhenno (1994) takes the argument a step further, criticizing the New World Order in which politicians are reduced to international trade negotiators who have ceased to be representatives of the common good. In other words, with the New World Order, the common good has been reduced to purely economic considerations, so collapsing the distinction between politics and economics. Schedler (1997), finally, provides an interesting explanation for the increase in anti-government and anti-state beliefs. He uses Habermas's "colonization thesis" to shed light on why the American Republican ideology that "the best state is no state" (Reagan) is rapidly spreading to other parts of the world. In the 1980s, Habermas (1987)
deplored the successful colonization of people's minds by politics and economics, transforming them into obedient citizens and good consumers. A decade after Habermas put forward this thesis, Scheldrer (1997) proposed that colonization had taken a different direction in the 1990s. He asserts that it is not, as Habermas suggested, the social and private spheres that have lost their autonomy (because of having been infiltrated and colonized with values prevalent in the political and economic spheres), but rather that politics as an autonomous sphere has become meaningless due to the merging of economics and politics.

So far, we need to acknowledge that the public-political is a multidimensional sphere comprising not only Arendt's constitutional aspects (focus on law and constitution), but also economic (focus on the specific model of the economic system) and civic aspects (focus on non-governmental, civic associations). It is important to point out that the suggestions to expand Arendt's focus on constitutional issues to include the economic and civic aspects, as part of public-political life, are relatively modest. For pragmatic reasons, I propose that we put aside, for now, intriguing debates on “electronic space and power” in the age of the Internet (Sassen, 1998, pp. 177–194) that draw our attention to transnational citizenship (for example, “netizens”) and new forms of civic action (for example, “cyber-cultural politics”, Lins Ribeiro, 1998).

Given the international scope of the IEA Civic Education Study, however, we need to pause and reflect on whether the expanded version of Arendt's model, which includes constitutional, economic and civic aspects in the public-political sphere, is also able to capture developments in other parts of the world. Samuel Huntington's comprehensive definition of political systems provides useful clues as to whether the spherical model is sufficiently culturally sensitive. Huntington (1993, p. 6) lists three main features of political systems: the sources of authority for government, purposes served by government, and procedures for constituting government. He then goes on to distinguish between democratic, semi-democratic and non-democratic political systems. In an attempt to avoid slippery ground, I will not pursue the issue of whether democracy and non-democracy should be treated as dichotomous variables, as Huntington suggests, or of whether a continuum, defined by a set of democracy indicators, exists, as many other political scientists suggest. Huntington's distinction between sources of authority ("the will of the people"), purpose ("the common good") and procedures of government (elections, referenda and the like) nevertheless appears to be helpful in determining whether constitutional, economic and civic aspects of the public-political sphere capture the entire spectrum of governmental functions in other parts of the world. In several countries, notably those with Confucian or Islamic traditions, moral aspects are inextricably linked with the purpose of government and with definitions of what constitutes the common good. Moreover, in a few countries, such as in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the constitution rests on the moral code of the Qur'an, moral and religious values saturate all aspects of government — its source of authority, its purpose and its procedures. “Soft authoritarianism” (Ban & Cummings, 1999; Cummings et al., 1988; Hitchcock, 1994; Huntington, 1993), or to use a more precise and less judgmental terminology, soft versions of “moral government”, must necessarily be included in our spherical model, given the international scope of the IEA Civic Education Study.

Not surprisingly, civic education in most Asian countries is strongly associated with moral education. For example, Japan has replaced its traditional notion of moral education, such as the pre-war shinshin, which was negatively associated with “morality-by-obedience”, militarism and ultranationalism, with a more interpersonal version of moral education (dotoku). This novel construction is based on the teachings of specific virtues (Khan, 1997, p. 132 ff.), such as courage, moderation and gentleness, valorization of scholarship and technology, and courtesy and kindness in interpersonal relations, that seem to be associated with the foundations for peace and democracy.

Thus, if we were to draw from Arendt's original spherical model, which calls for a strict separation of the three spheres, our perspective would ultimately be quite biased against non-Western political systems. For Arendt, any governmental action that attempts to influence citizens' belief systems and to determine personal characteristics of a good citizen, such as the Japanese dotoku curriculum, interferes with the private sphere. From a transcultural perspective, however, we would probably be left with only a few, strictly individualistically oriented liberal political systems that refrain from expecting certain moral behaviors and attitudes from their citizens, and, in even fewer cases, from their political leaders.

The demand that the public-political sphere be differentiated with regard to the constitutional, economic, civic and moral aspects of different political systems does not suggest, however, the existence of a strict cultural divide. For example, the demand to include moral education and character education in schools in the United States has been as much a recurrent theme (Heslep, 1995; McClellan, 1999) as the rally to purge Japanese schools of top-down morality lessons (Khan, 1997). In fact, several scholars have pointed out that the assumption of a clear-cut cultural divide between American and Asian values has unnecessarily dichotomized these two value systems (see Steiner-Khamsi et al., 2001). More importantly, there is a need for caution, given that all societies are multicultural, and thus comprise residents who hold different value systems. Hence, a political system that emphasizes moral values does not
refer to the actual practices of citizens but rather to “policy talk” and curricular frameworks implemented in schools.

In the remainder of this chapter, using as my base a selected review of literature in political science, sociology and philosophy, I distinguish four different spheres of citizenship – constitutional, economic, civic and moral – that political systems pursue with differing degrees of emphasis. I then identify prototypical cases for these different conceptions and examine whether the data from the IEA Civic Education Study support the findings from the literature review. In this regard, I put forward the following three hypotheses:

1. Educational programs in Asian countries manifest a strong commitment to moral aspects of citizenship education. I concentrate here on the Hong Kong case study because Hong Kong was the only Asian region to fully participate in the IEA Civic Education Study.1

2. The United States is the country with a state ideology that most visibly promotes both anti-statism or, more precisely, advocates an ideology of small government administration and strong civic associations, and a global free-market economy. I therefore expect that economic and civic aspects of citizenship education are more stressed in United States citizenship education than in the citizenship education of the other participating countries.

3. Countries undergoing political transformation are more likely to emphasize constitutional aspects of citizenship because they have recently established new constitutions and political systems. Here, I analyze the data from the Romanian case study as an example of a country that has recently undergone political transformation. I also include the German case study, because of its relatively recent transformation process, as well as its strong belief in the welfare state.

SPHERES OF CITIZENSHIP: A REVIEW OF THE CASE STUDIES

SAR Hong Kong, PR China

Typically, civic education in Hong Kong is covered in three different subjects: economic and public affairs (EPA), government and public affairs (GPA), and social studies. It is interesting to note that a process of increasing politicization accompanied the period of colonial transition (1984–1997), which was triggered by the Sino-British Declaration of 1984 and completed in 1997 with the establishment of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China. The curricular framework for the subject, GPA, which was introduced in 1988, brought about shifts in political alliances, with the previously exclusive emphasis on Western liberalism being reduced to a study of political processes in China. Overall, the 1988 GPA framework aimed to supplement the existing emphasis on economic development with an emphasis on political awareness. The learning objectives of GPA thus became centered on the analysis of the “concepts, structures, and processes involved in the study of government, political science and public affairs” (Lee, 1999, p. 317), objectives interpreted in my hypothetical model as the constitutional sphere of citizenship.

The occasional clue gleaned from the country case study report and the Civic Education Study’s international database indicate that Hong Kong schools value to some extent the moral sphere of citizenship. I was able to identify practices at the school but not the policy level that reflect a moral dimension of citizenship. In several grammar schools, moral education, or religious studies or ethics is taught at the junior level for students of ages 11 to 14 (Lee & Costas, 1996, p. 3). However, these classes are offered marginally overall (one lesson per week) and are integrated mainly within the constitutional sphere (civic duties and responsibilities). Despite the care that the Hong Kong research team took to include a representative range of school types in their case study (that is, schools with academic and non-academic orientations and schools of different religious orientation, including Taoist, Protestant, Catholic and Buddhist, as well as non-religious schools), I could find no significant commitment to the moral sphere. Although several passages in the case study show that individual schools, associations and parents are demanding an increased emphasis within schools on moral education, these very passages also indicate a lack of public support for a comprehensive reform that would enhance moral education in schools. A few informants in the Hong Kong case study seemed more concerned about the lack of political awareness or “civic-mindedness” among adolescents, voicing such concerns as:

Their understanding of the meaning of democracy is vague.
They are generally self-centered and selfish. They seldom care about their neighbors or even schoolmates.
Many of them mistakenly interpret democracy as their freedom to pursue their goals or interests (Lee, 1999, p. 323 ff.).

Negative perceptions of this kind regarding teenage behavior appear to be more indicative of a generation gap than the political culture in Hong Kong. According to the Hong Kong research team, there is a greater degree of public concern about
the increase of discipline problems in schools. However, the research team again points out that public concern of this nature is unlikely to lead to any special emphasis on values or moral education in schools (Lee, 1999, p. 319).

Hong Kong has undergone dramatic political and social changes over the last 15 years. This transformation process might account for the strong emphasis on constitutional and economic spheres of citizenship and the unexpectedly low priority placed on moral aspects of citizenship.

The United States

Civic education in United States schools is transmitted across several subjects, which is similar to the situation in the other participating countries. Also, students are exposed to civic education both in curricular, co-curricular and extra-curricular activities, such as mock elections or community-service learning (Hahn, 1999). Apart from the subject "civics" (generally taken in Grade 9), or "government" (usually Grade 12), classes in American history (often taken in Grades 5, 8 and 11) and social studies (throughout elementary and secondary schools) deal with civics-related issues. The author of the United States case study reports earlier studies from the National Center for Education Statistics (1997), which found that 75% of all high school graduates had taken at least one semester course in government.

In her comparative study, Becoming Political, Hahn (1998, p. 218) convincingly depicts the "problems approach" in social studies whereby teachers and students often discuss and reflect on controversial political, economic and social issues such as capital punishment, gay rights, affirmative action and gun control. The core civic subject differs from this interactive and reflexive approach to the study of social issues and public policy in that it appears to be relatively more knowledge-based, focusing on information regarding the structure and function of government at the national, state and local levels. The United States research team analyzed three widely used civics textbooks and found that all three books "begin with a discussion of representative democracy and introduce the United States Constitution as the foundation for government. Then they move through the three branches of government: Congress, the presidency and the courts" (Hahn, 1999, p. 591).

In the United States, non-governmental organizations play an active role in the development of teaching material and in educational programs and in-service training. These organizations are funded by government grants, corporations, philanthropic endeavors, private donors, or a combination of them all. The American case study highlights several trends in the development of new civics-related programs. Besides character education, which, in fact, needs to be regarded as a movement rather than a mere trend, service learning, economic literacy and legal education are appearing in schools. In 1997, the National Council on Economic Education formulated national standards in economics, which several schools have voluntarily adopted, while the Center for Civic Education developed the National Standards for Civics and Government, as well as a civics/government program, "We the People", which is being widely used according to the author of the United States case study (Hahn, 1999, p. 589).

The United States research team also explored connections between the economic and political systems as perceived by students, teachers and other educational experts. In 16 of the 50 states, enrollment in an economics course (usually offered in Grade 12) is a requirement for high school graduation. A fascinating finding of the United States case study is the general perception in the country that democracy and the market economy are intertwined. In fact, when students were asked "what democracy meant to them, many contrasted it with communism or socialism" (Hahn, 1999, p. 599). For these students the term "democracy" seems to be synonymous with "market economy". Even more striking is the absence of social welfare discussions in United States classrooms, a fact that supports the country's adherence to a free market economy with little state intervention.

The data from the United States case study suggest that the core civic subjects of "civics" or "government" emphasize exclusively the constitutional sphere. Surprisingly, students actually learn few civic action skills in the classroom. They are more likely to do so through whole school activities (student governance), community-service learning and other co-curricular and extra-curricular activities. However, although United States students are taught that the United States form of democracy is built on concepts of individual freedom, diversity and market economy, they simultaneously learn about the dangers of a government that can "grow too large and spend too much money" (Abraham Lincoln, cited in Hahn, 1999, p. 600).

Attempts within the United States to introduce the teaching of "civic virtues" and character education programs have been quite successful, with several states adopting them. As further evidence of this movement toward the teaching of civic virtues, the National Council for the Social Studies issued in 1997 a position statement urging social studies teachers "to refocus their classrooms on the teaching of character and civic virtue" (Hahn, 1999, p. 585).

Germany

Germany is no different from the other country case studies in terms of the marginal place that its core civic subject, political education (Politische
Bildung), holds in its schools. As the German team (Händle et al., 1999, 1997) document, political education is accorded one hour of instruction per week, and offered only after Grade 6. Other civics-related subjects include social studies (Sozialkunde) and community studies (Gemeinschaftskunde). In the remainder of this section on Germany, I summarize three findings that are repeatedly addressed in the German case study: the emphasis on social market economy, the emphasis on local political action, and the de-emphasis of national identity.

First, economic education is an integral part of the core civic subject, political education, which compares different economic systems and highlights the German model of “social market economy.” These features are particularly important in terms of Germany’s political context in which two opposing economic systems merged or, more accurately, were absorbed by one system, that of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The economics sections of civic education textbooks contrast the model of a “planned economy” (citing the German Democratic Republic, GDR, as the example) with the model of the “free-market economy” (for example, the United States). It is noteworthy that the textbooks provide a critical analysis of both systems, illuminating the disadvantages of each and offering a third model, the German model of “social market economy.” This particular model maintains a market economy orientation that appropriates the concept of social welfare, in which “the disadvantages of free-market competition are mitigated by a comprehensive system of social-welfare measures (health insurance, state pension system, unemployment benefits, housing subsidies, and the like)” (Händle et al., 1997, p. 6).

Second, like students of most of the participating countries in the IEA Civic Education Study, German students do not trust politicians, express little interest in party politics and are generally apathetic toward “official politics.” However, unlike the young people in the other three case studies presented here in some detail (Hong Kong, Romania and the United States), but similar to those in other case studies not discussed in this chapter (for example, Belgium, Greece and Portugal), adolescents in Germany are very much interested in local politics as well as in social issues (for example, racism, ecology and human rights). As a consequence, they tend to participate in civic actions and demonstrations at local level. Educators, recognizing these actions as political actions, make them objects of study in civics-related subjects, including political education. In fact, the experts surveyed in the German case study identified two main goals of civic education: the practice of democratic social interactions in the school, and the problem-solving involvement of students in their local communities (Händle et al., 1999, p. 279). There appears to be a

spheres of citizenship

striking consensus that civic actions provide a solid foundation for creating political awareness at national and international levels. Despite the existence of a gap between the goals of civic education and their actual implementation in schools, German educators nevertheless agree that civic education should move away from merely emphasizing government studies towards embracing a broader definition of politics that includes social movements, civic actions and initiatives at the local level.

Third, nationalism and national identity clearly carry negative connotations in Germany as a result of the crimes against humanity associated with the period of National Socialism. Thus, the strengthening of a national identity is clearly not a goal of civic education in Germany. Moreover, concepts such as “national identity”, “national consciousness”, “national pride” and (especially) “the German people” are critically scrutinized in social studies, political education and history education, and, hence, used reluctantly. Schools also have succeeded in resisting political pressure. This was particularly so in the early 1990s, shortly after re-unification, when demands were made of schools to become more active in healing the wounds of the “German people”, who, for over four decades, had been divided into two hostile political camps (FDR, GDR) with their opposing economic systems. Rather than re-activating the old fascist pre-war concept of national identity or creating a new post-reunification concept, schools responded by extensively teaching the history of the cold war and analyzing the events that led to the re-unification or integration of former East Germany into former West Germany. Tensions regarding the “one-sided” re-unification process are omnipresent in Germany, and inequities such as the extensive re-training program, the dismissal of civic teachers in former East Germany, and the fact that the history of the GDR “now occupies less space in textbooks that it did before the border was opened” (Neuner, 1997, p. 3) are publicly discussed. The resistance of educators against utilizing the teaching of history and civics-related subjects for the purpose of creating a sense of national identity and pride is remarkable. In fact, many educators see the European Union and the newly created “European consciousness” as the best substitute for the lack of national identity.

The German case study draws from various sources of information. The survey of German experts on political education, administered as part of the case study, found that almost two-thirds of the experts consider the creation of a European consciousness that would replace German national consciousness to be an important goal of civic education (Händle et al., 1999, p. 270). Also relevant here is the finding that, in Germany, the public-political sphere, as addressed in “political education”, is more focused on the local and European
levels, and, to a lesser extent, on the national level of involvement than it is in the other case study countries.

**Romania**

In many respects, the findings from the Romanian case study resemble those from the other case studies conducted in post-socialist countries. Experts on civic education in post-socialist countries appear to be determined to offer civic education in ways that are bare of any ideological and political content. The new Law of Education in Romania of July 1995 (*Monitorul Oficial*, Nr. 167), for example, stipulates that schools should not deal with politics and that all discussions of political issues should be banned from schools (Bunescu et al., 1997, question 14 ff.). Thus, the fear that political discussions may lead to “political militancy” (Bunescu et al., 1997, question 14c) renders the aim of civic education as one that seeks to raise political awareness without a discussion of politics. The process of purging schools of politics, referred to in Romania as the “de-ideologization” process, is also occurring in other post-socialist countries. The Russian case study, for example, reports that this process in Russian schools is meant to signal a rupture with the former communist ideology, the educational objectives of which were “hyper-ideologization and classroom regimentation” (Bogolubov et al., 1999, p. 526). Similarly, the Bulgarian case study authors report that current civic education programs have been developed in ways that signal a clear break with the previous highly politicized political education programs:

> For more than 40 years the concept “civic education” was replaced by the concept “communist education”, or, more concretely, “political ideology”, “social class and party”, and “patriotic and international” education, taught according to the principles of the Soviet educational system and communist ideology. Intercultural education was replaced by so-called “international education”, viewed in the light of “world revolution” and selfless devotion to the “Soviet system” .... “Communist education” represented a lack of differentiation between the concepts “public”, “social” and “civic”. The main idea in Marxist doctrine is the death of the State in favor of the communist party (Balkansky et al., 1999, p. 95).

Among Russian civic education experts the concept of “civic culture” appears to have found great resonance. Their notion differs from Almond and Verba’s (1963) concept (which, from the perspective of the Russian experts, excessively circumscribes civic culture as an element of political life) in that it is more often associated with civil society and comprises non-state institutions and regulatory processes.

In Romania, the re-activation of the state and of civic life by means of education takes on several forms. The core civic subject in Romanian schools, labeled “civic culture”, is offered one hour per week (36 hours per year) in both Grades 7 and 8 and is framed as an educational program that promotes democracy. The subject “moral-civic education” is also offered at elementary school level, in Grades 3 and 4.

Interestingly, “democratic culture”, which was introduced after the fall of communism in February 1990, has been replaced by “civic culture.” The mid-1990s saw a growing ambivalence towards the term “democracy” because of its increasing association with economic hardship, unemployment, cuts in social benefits, and other undesirable effects of the non-regulated economic market of the “transition period.” The Romanians drew the term civic culture from Almond and Verba’s work titled *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (1963), a book that is widely discussed in Central and Eastern European countries and that has been translated into multiple languages, including Romanian. In practice, however, the syllabi for civic culture courses read very much as government studies that focus on the constitution of Romania, citizens’ rights, the rights stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the structure and institution of the legal state and civil society. The Romanian case study indicates how “little emphasis is placed on encouraging political and social participation” (Bunescu et al., 1999, p. 517). The Romanian research team attributes this lack of emphasis on civil action to an over-emphasis on “cognitive objectives”, that is, the exclusive focus on knowledge at the expense of promoting participatory skills and civic values.

Despite Romania’s bookish and document-based civic culture program, the Romanian case study repeatedly underscores the importance of building a civil society. The same inconsistency – the gap between the idea that building a civic society should form the objective of civic culture teaching and the actual practice, which merely emphasizes the constitutional sphere – is also visible in the Russian and Bulgarian case studies. The Russian and Bulgarian research teams describe the program of their core civic subject as the study of the constitution, the political system and international documents (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international charters). However, at the same time, the Russian research team contends that civic education should not be “limited to political and legal studies” (Bogolubov et al., 1999, p. 341), while the Bulgarian research team attempts to understand why the current educational program fails to motivate students to take on civic responsibilities and actions. The Bulgarian researchers find that although students learn the elements of representational democracy, they do so only at the central level and not at the local level, where they are more likely to become politically involved.
Overall, the Romanian case study, along with the Russian and Bulgarian studies briefly mentioned here, reveal high expectations of educational programs. Their conclusion that a lack of political awareness and the presence of political apathy among adolescents (a phenomenon that is widespread in the countries participating in the Civic Education Study, whether or not they have a socialist past) is due to the educational system’s failure to create a “civil society” is, at first sight, dazzling. However, other studies on educational reform in post-revolutionary societies confirm that the transformational power attributed to educational programs is not uncommon in countries that have recently undergone major political and social change (see, for example, La Belle & Ward, 1990).

**THE HYPOTHETICAL MODEL AND THE CASE STUDY REVIEW: A COMPARISON**

In keeping with Ragin’s (1994, p. 111 ff.) assertion that “[s]everal basic features of the comparative approach make it a good strategy for advancing theory”, I have attempted in this chapter to review and refine existing theories on citizenship and civic education. Ragin (1994) and Walters (1992) claim that this central feature of comparative studies applies especially to comparative research interested in identifying and understanding differences or diversity rather than in tracing commonalities between various cases.

Using the spherical model in an attempt to expose the different dimensions of citizenship that, in turn, shape distinct models of civic education was more challenging than I expected, and at this point it is prudent to offer only tentative interpretations of my findings. My investigation of the case studies revealed no clear boundaries between the four spheres. The constitutional, economic, civic and moral spheres overlap, and all four spheres are stressed to a greater or lesser degree. Thus, the relevant consideration here is not whether the different models of civic education emphasize one or more spheres at the expense of others, but rather what these different spheres specifically mean within each context and how schools convey this particular meaning to students.

A closer examination of the semantics of “democracy” may serve as an example. As noted earlier, United States students associate the concept of democracy with capitalism and the free market economy. When asked to reflect on the meaning of democracy, many can respond only by contrasting it with communism or socialism. In contrast, German students equate democracy with their own economic system, the “social market economy”, and contrast it with the “free market economy” (United States) and the “planned economy” (former GDR and Soviet Union). To take this interpretation a step further, patriotism in these two countries clearly is not based on an ideology of an “imagined community” formed from a common past (Anderson, 1983), that is, on the one-nation-one-people paradigm. On the contrary, teachers and students distance themselves from such a monocultural conception of nation, either because they see their nation as a nation of immigrants (United States) or because they have experienced the abuses of nationalism (Germany). Instead, what I have found are signs of an ideology that Kleege (1997) calls “constitutional patriotism”, that is, patriotism based on identification with the constitution and, in particular, with the economic system (free market economy versus social market economy). In all the case study countries examined in this present analysis, the constitution is always taught in conjunction with the economic system to which it subscribes. I therefore suggest that for the purpose of further examination the constitutional and economic spheres should be merged into one, that is, the “constitutional-economic sphere”.

In all the case studies, the core civic subjects place considerable emphasis on the constitutional-economic sphere. In most cases, these subjects focus exclusively on three characteristics of government – sources of authority, purpose of government, and procedures of government (see Huntington, 1993) – even though they have different labels: government and public affairs (Hong Kong); civic or government (United States); political education (Germany); and civic culture (Romania). At the same time, the core civic subject is allocated a minimum amount of time in the curriculum. In most countries it is taught at upper secondary school level for one hour per week during one or two school years. My hypothesis, which stated that countries undergoing political transformation are more likely to emphasize constitutional aspects of citizenship, is not, therefore, supported by the empirical evidence. In Germany or Romania, additional time has not been allocated to the teaching of constitutional issues despite recent changes in the constitution and strong beliefs in a strong government. The time spent on constitutional-economic issues has remained the same in German schools, and has been drastically decreased in post-socialist Romania and in the post-socialist eastern states of Germany. In these countries of political transition, teaching of the core civic subjects, along with a few other subjects (especially history and geography), was, in fact, temporarily suspended until revised textbooks and a “re-trained” or new teaching force could be put in place. Contrary to my expectations, political changes have not led to the prioritization of the constitutional-economic sphere over the other spheres of citizenship.

Civic literacy, however, cannot be reduced to the core civic subjects alone since it is also an objective of moral or values education and social studies. Educational systems that offer moral and values education in a separate subject
tend to assign this particular subject to the elementary school level (Romania) or lower secondary school level (Hong Kong). Otherwise moral aspects of civic education (for example, civic virtues, responsibilities) are integrated as an element of social studies. Returning to our hypothetical model, we find that the curriculum of SAR Hong Kong does not manifest a higher degree of commitment toward moral education than the curricula in the other case studies. The fact that the citizens of Hong Kong were under British rule until 1997 and are, perhaps, “less Asian” in their value orientation than other regions and countries in Asia might explain why Hong Kong needs to be considered a special case. Then again, a solid qualitative analysis brings to the surface historical facts and cultural contexts that force us to consider every country as a special case. Hence, Germany is hardly representative of a Western European country given its recent “re-unification”; Romania, culturally, does not identify with Slavic post-socialist countries; and the United States generally is regarded as non-comparable.

The civic sphere, if addressed as an issue at all, is most visibly included in social studies, in co-curricular activities (for example, “project week” in Germany) and extra-curricular activities (“service learning” in the United States). It is interesting that civic associations (for example, Amnesty International or Greenpeace in Germany) and non-governmental organizations (for example, the Soros Foundation in Central and Eastern Europe) that are outside the educational systems provide educational programs (or better “educational packages”) that aim to strengthen the civic sphere in civics-related teaching in schools. Contrary to my expectations, United States schools do not take a leading role in preparing their students for civic action. Although social studies in the United States prepares students to discuss and reflect on controversial social issues and public policy concerns, it is, compared to similar subject matters in other countries, not particularly civics-action oriented.

In contrast, German students, teachers and other educational experts place a much higher priority on civic action. This unexpected finding can be partially explained by the fact that social studies teachers in Germany emphasize local politics and Bürgerinitiativen, literally translated as “citizen initiatives”, that is, non-partisan political initiatives at local level. Educational experts in Germany recognize that, unlike the situation in relation to party politics, adolescents can become politically active in these local initiatives despite being below voting age. Besides these different political contexts in Germany and the United States, pragmatic pedagogical reasons also may account for the difference. In Germany, social studies is not as textbook-centered as its United States counterpart. Social studies teachers, in addition to using textbooks, and sometimes instead of using textbooks, develop their

own material using current political events or they adopt material published by professional associations of political education. Thus, German social studies teachers are allowed a greater degree of flexibility in the inclusion of current local political events and social movements in their civics-related resources.

CROSSING EDUCATIONAL, DISCURSIVE AND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES

Having failed from an examination of the case studies to find supporting evidence for the different models of civic education (as based on my review of relevant literature), I suggest that we reflect on the discrepancy between the theory and the practice of civic education. In retrospect, it appears naïve to assume that schools mirror society, and that civic education policies reflect the underlying political culture of their system. In particular, the attempt to categorize models of civic education by identifying four different spheres of citizenship that, depending on the political context, emphasize some spheres more than others, has not yielded meaningful interpretation. In fact, none of my predictions explain differences and similarities between different civic education models. Civic education curricula in Hong Kong are not particularly moralistic, German and Romanian curricula emphasize constitutional aspects no more than other countries, and civic education programs in the United States do not place a particularly high priority on teaching about the economy nor do they engage students in civic actions. Moreover, in all four examined case studies, the political and economic spheres are inextricably linked.

Among the different case studies I found more similarities than differences. The core civic subject, that is, civics or government in the United States, political education in Germany, civic culture in Romania, and government and public affairs in Hong Kong, are very much alike with regard to content. They transmit constitutional knowledge regarding both the political and economic aspects of the constitution. It is important to point out, however, that teachers and students in both the United States and Germany define their own model of democracy within an economic framework. For German respondents, democracy needed to be grounded in a “social market system” whereas the United States respondents expressed loyalty and patriotism toward their own model of democracy, a model that, in their view, is diametrically opposed to communism in that it secures the principles of a free market economy.

The unexpected finding of the discrepancy between theories of citizenship and practices of civic education in various contexts calls for further investigation. It is a puzzle as to why the qualitative data from the case studies have not been
substantiated by the spherical model that I used as an interpretive framework. In fact, as already noted, there are more similarities than differences than the spherical model of citizenship or, for that matter, any other multidimensional model of civic education would have predicted. Explaining the discrepancy between theory and practice might provide us with important clues for designing appropriate methods of inquiry that are capable of grasping the complexity of civic education. The possibility that civic education transcends three types of boundary: (1) educational, (2) discursive, and (3) national — may help explain this discrepancy.

In regard to the first boundary, civic education, more than mathematics and science, for example, intersects different educative sites both inside and outside of schools. Civic literacy is taught in the civic education core subject (for example, civics, government) only one hour per week in one or two grades of upper secondary schools or high schools. It is not fully covered in social studies, history education, moral education and other school subjects. As the authors of the case studies unanimously point out, civic literacy is a comprehensive concept that builds on a culture of participation created in class, school and the greater community. Precisely because there are different educative sites for civic literacy, we would gain only a limited understanding of adolescents' political socialization if we examined exclusively curricular frameworks and policies in formal education. What adolescents learn from their peers, family, media, teachers, communities and other educative sites with regard to civic literacy is not the same, and, more often than not, is contradictory, and thus does not correspond to a singular political culture but rather to several political cultures existing side by side.

As for the second (discursive) boundary, civic literacy is a sensitive political issue. Terms such as “democracy”, “civil society” or “civic culture”, in particular, are highly charged concepts that are often used to send out particular economic and political signals associated with stability, progress and human rights. When analyzing the qualitative data, I encountered difficulties in distinguishing between different layers of civic education policies. Several case studies are more transparent than others with regard to what constitutes “policy talk”, that is, what is defined ideologically as desirable, what is formally outlined in policy documents (“policy action”), and what is actually implemented in the school (“policy implementation”). This distinction regarding policy studies, first proposed by Tyack and Cuban (1995) and (Cuban, 1998), is indispensable for the study of civic education policies. Other case studies, in contrast, clearly mention the discrepancies between policy talk, policy documentation and policy implementation. The case studies of civic education in Bulgaria (Balkansky et al., 1999) and Romania (Bunescu et al., 1999), for example, suggest that civic education has made its way into white policy papers but not necessarily into classrooms. The apparent gap between these different levels of educational practice and policy deserves careful analysis, and not only in Central and Eastern Europe.

Consideration of the third boundary brings to our attention a fascinating issue that came to light precisely because the original method of inquiry failed to produce coherent interpretations. I found traces of transnational educational borrowing. For a variety of political or economical reasons (Steiner-Khamsi, 2000), policy-makers borrow civic education programs from other educational systems. Rather than assuming that each system has its own political culture or cultures, a transnational perspective draws attention to patterns associated with the merging or converging of several systems into a larger system. Today, the large systems are, of course, no longer communism versus capitalism, but rather, distinctions within capitalist or “democratic” systems. In the case studies presented here, I was able to identify two large competing systems: the democracy model of “free market economy” (United States) and the democracy model of “social market economy” (Germany, Western Europe). Certainly, there are other large systems that did not surface in the case studies, such as the “socialist market economy” model advocated by the People’s Republic of China. In addition to these three (or more) large systems, there seem to be other free-floating systems that are in the process of merging with one of the larger systems. Because of the strong impact of United States-based agencies and organizations in Central and Eastern Europe (for example, CIVITAS, the Junior Achievement Project, the Soros Foundation), “civic culture” subjects in Romania and Bulgaria are tending to float toward the free market economy model of democracy.

In comparative education, research on educational transfer (educational borrowing, lending and imposition) examines convergence and divergence effects in education. The impact of the United States democracy model on civic education reform in Central and Eastern Europe is particularly well suited to the examination of transfer processes, namely, the lending and borrowing of civic education programs.

A focus on the lending system of the United States would generate a series of pressing questions, such as why United States-based agencies and organizations, more than the bilateral aid agencies of other countries, emphasize so much civil-society-building as a major goal of civic education in Eastern and Central Europe? We are witnessing an interesting phenomenon that is currently understudied in the research on educational transfer: the borrowing of a concept (“civil-society-building”) that is not considered a core concept in its original context (the United States). An investigation of this exported concept challenges
the widely held belief that borrowing is always based on concrete experiences gained elsewhere.

Another new phenomenon of educational transfer that deserves a comparative look is the emergence of educational packages for civic education. The wholesale transfer of civic education packages, which include modules for teacher training, textbooks for students, and teacher manuals that are translated into the national language(s) and nationally adapted, is relatively recent (Steiner-Khamsi, 1998). For educators, in particular, the greatest concern is the lack of adaptation to local context. Very often the adaptation of imported educational material is dismal, reduced to replacing the illustrations, inserting excerpts from the constitution, and changing the references to the political system in ways that correspond to the new national context.

A focus on the borrowing system (of, for example, Romania, Bulgaria), in turn, produces important questions of a different kind. For example, what do policy-makers in the borrowing systems mean exactly when they identify “civil-society-building” as the main objective of core civic subjects? Is it more than a mere political signal (“policy talk”)? Is it the first step in a longer series of steps that will eventually lead to actual “policy action” and “policy implementation”? Lynch (1998, p. 24) has coined the powerful term “flags of convenience” to denote frequently used concepts that function as positive political signals for attracting international funding. Although these concepts can mobilize funding, they do not necessarily get implemented. It is a common phenomenon that resources are shifted to other projects once these flags of convenience have succeeded in soliciting funding. Lynch mentions “poverty alleviation”, “girls’ education” and “multiculturalism” as powerful key words that attract international funding in the Third World context. Similarly, “civil-society-building” functions as a flag of convenience in post-socialist countries that signals the willingness to borrow from “old democracies” and, as a consequence, succeeds in mobilizing funds for civic education programs. However, it is questionable how much of the resources allocated for civic-society-building and civic education programs is actually used for implementing new initiatives. Several researchers of educational transfer have therefore suggested that we need to turn our attention to the politics and economics of transfer processes in order to explain why some discourses, models or practices are borrowed, lent or imposed while others are not (see, for example, Steiner-Khamsi, 2000).

The study of civic education is complex because civic literacy spans different educational sites, operates at different policy levels (talk, action, implementation) and crosses national boundaries. We would not have been able to comprehend the scope of this complexity if we had not been confronted with the contradictions and inconsistencies that this particular method of inquiry has unexpectedly generated. In light of the complexity that qualitative data tends to disclose, we seem to be situated at a methodological crossroads. A multi-level analysis (Bray & Thomas, 1995) that simultaneously explores the different educational sites, different policy levels and globalization effects in civic education would greatly enhance our understanding of civic literacy for purposes of academic curiosity and applied policy research.

NOTE

1. Chinese Taipei initially took part in the study, but did not submit a complete data set.

REFERENCES


Spheres of Citizenship


8. AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF CITIZENSHIP IN THE CURRICULUM: THE IEA NATIONAL CASE STUDIES AND THE INCA ARCHIVE

David Kerr

INTRODUCTION

The triangulation described in this chapter brought together different layers of qualitative data about citizenship education within and across countries. The sources of information used to formulate national case studies for Phase 1 of the IEA Civic Education Study, notably empirical, document review and curriculum analyses, were supplemented and enhanced by policy statements from the INCA Archive and by the professional judgements, experiences and views of experts in the field. The breadth and depth of these different layers of data afforded the opportunity to analyze and interpret similarities and differences between the layers. The result was a rich comparative analysis of citizenship education which, while indebted to the findings from the Phase 1 national case studies, enabled the construction of wider 'frames' through which to view citizenship education. These frames provide insights into the nature and status of citizenship education and the common challenges in this area within